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 [D]omestic violence is probably the most problematic area of application [of 
restorative justice], and here great caution is advised. - Howard Zehr, 2003 
 
Introduction 
This paper explores the feasibility of offering a restorative justice (RJ) approach in cases 
of domestic violence (DV). I argue that widely used RJ processes—such as 
‘conferencing’1—are unlikely to be sufficiently safe or effective in cases of DV, at least 
as these processes are standardly designed and practiced (Sections 1-6).2 I then support 
the view that if RJ is to be used in cases of DV, then new specialist processes will need 
to be co-designed with key stakeholders to ensure they embody not only RJ principles, 
but also feminist theory3 and the concept of transformative justice (Section 7). 
1 .  ADDRESSING CUMULATIVE HARM 
1.1. Single-incident Focus 
Standard RJ processes have been primarily designed to focus on repairing the harm 
caused by a single offence or crime.4 There is an institutional reason for this focus: RJ 
programs are usually set up to take referrals from the criminal justice system; and so 
they automatically take on many of the assumptions embedded in criminal law, one of 
which is to identify and treat criminal behaviour in terms of individual acts taken in 
isolation.  
The problem is that DV cannot be reduced to one isolated incident, or even one 
type of offence. DV involves a series of multiple types of harmful acts that are inflicted 
against the same person over time. Moreover, this behaviour tends to increase in 
severity, both in terms of the degree of violence used and as a result of the cumulative 
impact. In other words, the harm caused by DV cannot be confined to a single offence, 
no matter how serious. But then it follows that, much like criminal justice prosecutions, 
standard RJ processes are inherently ill-equipped to address the kind of harm that is 
generally caused by DV.5  
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It might be thought that, unlike legislatively bound court procedures, RJ processes 
are more flexible, and so could be adapted to accommodate the recurring and 
cumulative impact of DV. But this is precisely the point: standard RJ processes must 
be substantially re-designed if they are to be used appropriately in the context of DV. 
1.2. The Apology Cycle  
Hearing an apology is one of the key benefits of RJ for those who have been harmed. 
However, men who are responsible for inflicting DV routinely use apologies as a 
recurring tool of abuse (often called the ‘apology cycle’). This strategy works by 
exploiting their partner’s hope that the abuse will stop. Over time, the effectiveness of 
this strategy will, of course, diminish as she no longer trusts his faux remorse. 
Nevertheless, the apology cycle is often a key factor in perpetuating the accumulating 
harm.6 Women who are harmed by DV are therefore likely to feel intensely suspicious 
and distrustful of any RJ process, given that an apology from the person responsible 
for causing harm is considered to be central.7  
It might be argued that an apology offered within a RJ process will be more 
thoroughly prepared and so is more likely to be genuine. But given the prevalence of 
the apology cycle in cases of DV, it is unlikely that the person harmed will be persuaded 
that ‘he means it this time’.8 And facilitators are not in a position to question her 
judgment: no matter how genuine his depth of remorse might seem to a facilitator, 
they will not have witnessed the preceding succession of faux apologies. For all the 
facilitator knows, the apparent levels of remorse expressed on multiple occasions in the 
past may have been equally, if not more ‘impressive’ than the remorse displayed in the 
RJ process. Facilitators have no way of assessing the comparative sincerity of his 
remorse; and so cannot form a reliable judgement about his current sincerity.  
It might be pointed out that this predicament will be true of most non-DV cases: RJ 
facilitators will rarely have any experience of the person responsible for causing harm 
prior to the current case, and so will be unable to make a comparative assessment of 
their sincerity. But this would not usually prevent a RJ process from proceeding safely 
and effectively. So why should it do so in cases of DV?  
However, the specifics of DV make this lack of evidence a serious obstacle. To give 
a hypothetical: Suppose it was known that a person responsible for causing harm had 
previously attended multiple RJ meetings. In each case, the person harmed truly 
believed that he had shown genuine remorse and so she accepted his apology. But then, 
only a day or two after the meeting, he inflicted the same kind of offence against her. 
And this pattern continued, time after time. No responsible facilitator would be willing 
to allow him to participate in yet another RJ process. Given his history of faux 
apologies, no amount of preparatory work would enable a facilitator to form a 
reasonable judgement that he ‘really means it this time’. But this is precisely the 
situation in the case of DV, where the apology cycle has been a primary tool of abuse. 
As one refuge worker put it:  
Restorative Justice and Domestic Violence 
© Derek R. Brookes, 2019  Page 3 of 25 
 “He can say he's sorry and acknowledge what he's done until he's blue in the face but what 
victims want is behaviour change. This needs to be gauged over a period of time. A restorative 
forum may result in women developing unrealistic expectations of behaviour change and making 
a decision to stay with him as a result – you only need to see these guys in front of a judge to see 
how skilled they are at acting to their audience – then everyone may pack up and go home feeling 
they’ve done a great day’s work and it's all settled. Who monitors behaviour change long term? 
Do we send them away and wait until next time?” 9 
2 .  ONGOING RELATIONSHIPS 
Standard RJ processes have been designed primarily for crimes in which the person 
responsible is not (or at least need not be) in an ongoing relationship with the person 
harmed, let alone an intimate relationship. There are several features that have 
consequently been ‘built-in’ to standard RJ processes, any one of which will make the 
use of such processes suboptimal and even unsafe for cases in involving DV.  
2.1. Preparation 
RJ processes have been designed to provide participants with a ‘safe place’ to talk about 
highly emotional and vulnerable matters: the preparation, structure, layout and setting 
of a RJ process have all been planned in advance to minimise unnecessary conflict and 
to maximise the chances of a restorative outcome. So, for instance, the standard RJ 
process will begin with a preparation phase: the facilitators will meet with the person 
responsible and the person harmed separately to prepare them for an eventual meeting. 
At this stage, the facilitators will try to ensure that there is very little, if any, 
communication between them. If anything does need to be communicated, this would 
always be done indirectly via the facilitators. Again, there are usually protocols 
stipulating that, when the participants meet, they should, if possible, use separate 
entrances and exits. If that is not practical, they should arrive and enter the room 
separately. These communicative restrictions are in place for good reason: they 
safeguard the process from unhelpfully pre-emptive conversations or behaviour. But if 
the participants are in regular unfacilitated contact before a RJ process—as will often 
be the case with DV—then these standard safe-guards cannot be applied. As a 
consequence, there could be significant repercussions, in terms of the safety and 
effectiveness of any RJ process.  
Once again, it might be argued that RJ processes could be adapted to take into 
account this unique context. But this is just to make the point being advanced in this 
paper: the way in which RJ processes are standardly designed and practiced will need 
to be significantly amended if they are to be used in a DV context. 
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2.2. Support Persons 
A ‘restorative justice conference’ is designed to provide both the person harmed and 
the person responsible with the opportunity to bring their respective support persons 
to the conference (e.g. family members, friends and/or other types of support persons). 
But this design feature was incorporated on the assumption that each respective group 
of support persons would be unlikely to know each other or be in close or regular 
contact. This is also the optimal situation, for similar reasons to those given above. 
Unfacilitated and unprepared conversations could easily undermine the process and 
may even endanger the participants. Hence, standard RJ processes will, where possible, 
restrict any direct communication between the respective support persons prior to the 
conference as a way of safeguarding the process.  
The problem for DV cases is that the respective support persons are very likely to 
be in-laws, or mutual friends, or know each other in some other way. So it is far more 
likely that they will be in regular, unfacilitated contact outside the context of the RJ 
process. Once again, in such cases, any standard RJ process will need to be amended 
to take this into account if it is to function optimally and safely in cases of DV. 
2.3. Follow-up 
Standard RJ processes will generally involve only one meeting in which the participants 
can talk together to address the harm. After this, they will usually have separate follow-
up meetings with the facilitators. It is rare for participants to attend follow-up meetings 
together, since the process is structured so that they are given ample opportunity to say 
what needs to be said and to hear what needs to be heard in the meeting itself. Any 
failure or shortfall in this respect would be due to the unwillingness or inability of the 
participants. For this reason, unless there are exceptional circumstances, the facilitators 
would be unlikely to hold an additional meeting.  
This does not entail that there is no communication after a meeting. For instance, 
it is standard practice to let the person harmed know when the person responsible has 
completed any agreed action plan. But this communication is always done via the 
facilitators to safeguard the process and the participants. The problem is that, in most 
cases of DV, the participants will be in an ongoing relationship, or will at least need to 
communicate about parenting or other joint responsibilities. Hence, this standard 
safeguard cannot be applied in such cases. So, once again, the way that RJ processes 
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3 .  INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS  
3.1.  Triggers 
RJ facilitators will generally not have any professional expertise or background 
knowledge in the complex and challenging area of DV. For instance, the training 
provided to RJ facilitators is typically no more than a 2-5 day event, and so will 
invariably focus on the bare essentials: namely, ensuring that trainees have an adequate 
grasp of RJ principles, basic psychological assumptions, the structure of one or more 
standard RJ processes and a range of facilitation skills (e.g. active listening). Again, 
many RJ programs, as a matter of principle, utilise ordinary members of the community 
as facilitators. In other programs, facilitators are drawn from backgrounds such as 
social work or criminal justice. In either case, the facilitators may have some specialist 
knowledge of DV, but this would be rare and so cannot generally be assumed.  
Even if a facilitator does have (or acquires10) some expertise in DV, the standard 
time-frames for eligibility assessments and preparation are, in most RJ programs, highly 
constrained—especially if the program takes referrals as a diversion from prosecution 
or a deferred sentence. Facilitators will often only have time for one or two meetings 
within which they are required to make a full assessment and prepare participants for 
the RJ meeting. With such a limited time-frame, facilitators are crucially dependent 
upon how each participant is feeling, where they are at in their lives, or how they 
happen to present themselves at the time. This will include their current state of 
vulnerability, their willingness to trust the facilitators, their self-awareness, memory 
recall, general mental health, and so on.  
The problem with this lack of training, expertise and/or time is this: in any 
conference setting, men who inflict DV are proficient at deploying a range of ‘micro-
behaviours’ designed to manipulate or coerce their partners without being detected by 
a third-party. These behaviours can be as subtle as a change in tone of his voice, a 
certain way of looking at her, or a specific word or phrase. Any one of these behaviours 
could signal a threat or trigger her memory of abusive behaviour, and thereby compel 
her, out of fear, into accepting his ‘apology’ or agreeing to an outcome plan that 
continues to place her in danger.11 Given their standard constraints on time, training 
and expertise, most facilitators cannot be expected to have the capacity to identify, and 
therefore challenge the full range of these ‘person-specific’ strategies. The person 
harmed may be able to warn facilitators about some of these micro-behaviours in 
advance. But the detail or extent of her warning will be dependent on a number of 
contingent and unpredictable factors: for instance, she may not recall all of the 
behaviours, or be able to describe them with sufficient precision.12 She may not even 
be conscious of many of these triggers, perhaps because she has come to see her 
partner’s behaviour as ‘normal’ or ‘deserved’.13 Even if a facilitator manages to identify 
and ‘call-out’ a manipulative micro-behaviour in the process of a conference, the 
automatic nature of psychological triggers is such that it is likely to have already done 
its coercive work. In any case, a standard RJ process is no more than a brief snap-shot 
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in the lives of the participants: even if it were possible to protect the person harmed 
from these strategies for the duration of a RJ meeting, this is unlikely to shift the 
balance of power over the longer-term.  
In short, standard RJ processes have not been designed—and facilitators are not 
typically equipped—to be able to offer adequate protection from this kind of hidden 
manipulation or coercion. Even if the facilitators could do so, this brief moment of 
‘empowerment’ could mislead the person harmed into agreeing to an outcome plan 
that will be unsafe for her.14 On both counts, then, the way that RJ processes are 
standardly designed and practiced could potentially place the person harmed at 
significant risk of continued abuse and re-traumatisation. 
3.2. Voice  
A core part of every standard RJ process involves the person harmed expressing in 
some detail how they have been affected by the wrongdoing. Part of the reason for this 
is to make sure the person responsible is fully aware of the consequences of their 
actions. This can have a powerful impact on their conscience, and thus motivate them 
to desist from such actions in the future. It also enables the person harmed to be ‘heard’ 
and thus for them to feel re-empowered, often for the first time since the offence.  
However, in the context of DV, it is not clear that this part of a RJ process will work 
in the usual way. On the contrary, it could have seriously damaging consequences for 
the person harmed: First, it is likely that she will already have told her partner, on 
multiple occasions, how his actions have been harming her, but without any success. 
Telling him yet again in a RJ meeting is therefore unlikely be any more effective. 
Second, if she has not yet had the opportunity to tell her partner about the impact of 
his behaviour, or at least not in any detail, then there is a real danger that he might use 
this information as additional ‘ammunition’. Now he knows exactly the kind of 
behaviours that will hurt her the most; and so, if she agrees to stay in the relationship, 
he could become far more effective in his control and abuse of her.15 
4 .  GENDER EQUALITY 
4.1.  Apologies 
RJ is premised on the assumption that all human beings are of equal intrinsic worth. 
The underlying message of moral harm or wrongdoing, however, is to deny this 
assumption. If you commit a wrongful act against me, you send me the message that I 
am ‘less than’ you, that I can be ‘used for your purposes’, that you ‘do not deserve my 
respect as an equal’.16 One way of understanding the purpose of a RJ meeting, then, is 
to see it as enabling the person responsible to communicate to the person harmed that 
he no longer stands by these cruel and degrading messages. The role of the person 
responsible is to acknowledge, clearly and without qualification, that the person 
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harmed is of equal intrinsic worth. This acknowledgement lies at the core of what it 
means to offer a genuine apology.17  
The problem is that, in most cases, DV is motivated or justified by discriminatory 
and degrading views about women: that is, a man who inflicts DV will typically take 
the view that men are inherently superior to women and are therefore ‘entitled’ or 
‘authorised’ to rule over or control them (e.g. to be the ‘head of the house’).18 But then 
it follows that, if a man who has inflicted DV retains this view, then they cannot 
genuinely participate in a RJ process. Their apology, by definition, would be insincere.  
As a response to this obstacle, it might be suggested that a RJ service could partner 
with a behaviour change program, so as to ensure that any sexist beliefs and attitudes 
are rectified prior to the RJ process.19 However, this kind of moral change is 
exceptionally difficult, and the evidence for effective and enduring transformation is 
not promising.20 There is even evidence that behaviour change programs can reinforce 
beliefs about male superiority:  
“In cases where men’s oppressive behavior is challenged, such as batterer intervention 
programs . . . or prison antiviolence groups . . . men often collaborate to outwit social workers 
and assert a right to control women. Inequality is thus reproduced when males uncritically affirm 
oppressive elements of other males’ manhood acts or conspire to resist challenges to those 
acts.”21  
A far more significant obstacle that such programs face is the fact that gender 
equality is widely disputed at a societal level. This means that men who inflict DV can, 
and typically will justify or excuse their behaviour by appealing to values that are widely 
accepted in mainstream culture and religious communities.22 Behaviour change 
programs on their own cannot be expected to defeat or reverse this kind of systemic, 
cultural sexism.23 But then it follows, on both counts, that merely requiring a man who 
has inflicted DV to complete a behaviour change program prior to the RJ process will 
not, on its own, necessarily guarantee its safety or effectiveness.  
4.2. The Influence of Support Persons 
A related problem is that standard RJ conferences will invite the support persons of the 
person responsible to attend. The reason for doing so is that his family and friends are 
uniquely able to condemn his actions, whilst ensuring that he knows that they still love 
and respect him as a person—a process that John Braithwaite calls ‘reintegrative 
shaming’.24 But in DV cases, the family members and friends of a man who has inflicted 
DV will often hold similar beliefs and attitudes about the inequality of women; and so 
they are more likely to affirm his justifications and excuses—an outcome that would be 
diametrically opposed to the central purpose of a RJ process. A facilitator may be able 
to exclude his family members and friends from the meeting, but they cannot exclude 
them from his life. Their influence will be felt, whether they attend or not. Standard 
RJ processes are not equipped to address this issue.25 
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RJ conferences also invite the support persons of the person harmed, and this creates 
a similar issue. In many cultures and religious communities, a woman who separates 
from or divorces her husband is strongly condemned. She would thereby bring shame 
not only on herself, but on her wider family group. For this reason, the family and 
friends of a woman who has been harmed by DV can place a great deal of pressure on 
her to withdraw (or at least suppress) her accusations and be ‘reconciled’ to her abusive 
husband.26 The underlying assumption here is that women are not considered as equal 
to men, and so they should submit to and remain with their husband—even if he is 
violent. A facilitator might exclude such family members and friends from the process, 
but their influence will remain. So again, standard RJ processes on their own do not 
have the capacity to address this issue; and yet it clearly has the potential to undercut 
the restorativeness of the process.27 
5 .  RECONCILIATION 
5.1.  Moral Repair vs. Relationship Repair 
In the majority of cases that are referred to RJ programs, there is no pre-existing 
relationship between the participants. They may know of each other in a minimal sense 
(e.g. they live in the same area or go to the same school or workplace); but they are 
typically strangers. This has had a central impact on the way in which standard RJ 
processes have been designed. Specifically, the primary goal of a standard RJ process 
is to enable the participants to engage in the work of ‘moral repair’, but not 
‘relationship repair’. In other words, RJ is designed to enable the participants to engage 
in acts such as: the person who has caused harm taking responsibility for their actions 
and offering an apology; the person harmed saying how they were affected, responding 
to the apology, and so on. But this work of moral repair can be carried out even where 
the participants do not have a pre-existing relationship and do not intend to start one. 
The only relational connection that moral repair assumes is that each person is willing 
to acknowledge that they each share a common humanity.28 They can relate to each 
other on that basis, without needing to have (or have had) a personal or intimate 
relationship.  
The problem is this: When the work of moral repair is carried out within the context 
of a pre-existing relationship, this is usually driven by a desire to engage in relationship 
repair. When people in a personal or intimate relationship have engaged successfully 
in the work of moral repair, they will tend to regard this as grounds for being reconciled 
to each other. In other words, when moral repair occurs in the context of a relationship, 
it is typically seen as more or less equivalent to relationship repair. But this has seriously 
detrimental and even dangerous consequences when it comes to the use of RJ in DV 
cases, as the following examples show. 
First, in any DV case, the man who was responsible—and potentially some or all of 
both sets of support persons—will agree to take part in RJ for the sole purpose of 
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bringing about reconciliation. This can be for cultural or religious reasons and/or to 
make sure he can avoid legal repercussions. The facilitators may caution the 
participants that reconciliation is not the primary aim of RJ, and that they should not 
feel pressured to re-start or continue the relationship. But given the close connection 
between moral repair and relationship repair, it will be difficult for the woman to resist 
the (often explicitly expressed) assumption that, in light of the moral repair work 
achieved in the RJ process, she no longer has any grounds for leaving her partner—
even if that is the safest option for her.29   
Second, in most RJ programs, the facilitators will generally expect to have only 
minimal contact with the participants after the RJ meeting. This is because it is 
assumed that the participants are unlikely to have anything to do with each other after 
the meeting, and so there will not be any ongoing relationship issues or long-term 
repair-work that may require the support and assistance of the program. However, if 
the woman who has been harmed is persuaded to return or stay with her partner as a 
result of the RJ process, then the work of moral repair is likely to be a long-term 
undertaking, given the potential for relapse. But RJ processes, as standardly designed 
and practiced, are not able to provide this kind of ongoing relational support and 
assistance.30 Koss makes this point well in the following, where she distinguishes 
between the use of conferencing for DV and acquaintance rape: 
“Because a batterer’s purpose in using psychological and emotional abuse is often long term and 
related to coercing further behavior by the survivor, it is less amenable to external control by 
conference organizers. For those cases of acquaintance rape in which an ongoing intimate 
relationship is not an issue, good preconference preparation and consistently enforced rules of 
conduct for the conference itself could be expected to minimize the occurrence of further 
psychological and emotional harm to the survivor.”31 
It might be argued that this demand for post-meeting support is not consistent with 
a key principle of RJ, namely, that any ongoing work of moral or relational repair 
should be devolved to the participants’ respective communities of care. This principle 
might be applied to the typical ‘one-off’ crimes or incidents that are referred to RJ 
programs. But it would be a serious mistake to suppose that it might be possible to 
devolve responsibility to communities of care to provide ongoing protection and 
support in cases of DV. As Julie Stubbs states: 
“Outcome plans for domestic violence may require a significant commitment of resources over 
time in order to respond to a victim’s concerns. For instance, . . . for community disapproval to 
be effective and to provide protection, it needs to be backed by extensive resources including 
programs for offenders, holding facilities and recourse to injunctions, curfews, and strong 
sanctions. Can the ‘community of care’ assembled for the restorative process sustain such 
demands? Who will monitor the outcome? Over what period? Restorative justice processes are 
said to engage the community in responding to the offending behaviour . . . . However, this 
appeal to community offers little real guidance as to mechanisms for accountability.”32 
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5.2. Motivation for Staying 
It is often suggested that one distinctive benefit of using RJ in at least some DV cases 
is that it can provide a non-separation option. Many women, it is argued, want to stay 
with their partners, but they just want the violence to stop. Yet most other DV 
interventions—whether criminal justice or informal—are strongly orientated toward 
facilitating or bringing about separation.33  
“Studies have repeatedly shown that people subjected to [Intimate Partner Violence] opt out of 
the legal system because they love their partners and want to maintain relationships with them. 
In a recent study of the Bennington, VT Integrated Domestic Violence Court, 70% of the 
couples who came through the system were either still involved in their relationships or planned 
to continue them . . . The CLS’s focus on punishment is inconsistent with that goal.”34 
So it could be argued that RJ might serve to honour and support a woman’s decision 
to stay.35 The problem is that using RJ for this particular reason is fraught with 
complexities. For instance, there is strong evidence that women can choose to stay with 
a violent partner for reasons other than a desire to remain in a relationship with him. 
For example, they may not have the independent financial means to leave36; or they 
might feel that they or their children would be under significant risk of violent, even 
fatal repercussions37; or they may be under enormous pressure from their religious 
community, family members or cultural context. But if these externalities were 
removed, for instance, by sufficient legal aid, state-protection, adequate financial 
assistance, and the mobilisation of community support38, then—and only then—might 
it become clear as to whether a woman is genuinely free to decide whether or not stay 
with her partner.39  
“Providing economic resources could help people subjected to [Intimate Partner Violence] to 
leave abusive relationships in which they would otherwise be entrapped. Justice could entail 
attempts to ensure people subjected to IPV have their basic economic needs met, without 
interference from their partners, so that their choices about the future of their relationships are 
not constrained by economic necessity.”40 
In other words, a woman might agree to participate in RJ only because she feels that 
leaving the relationship—which is what she really wants—is still not a safe or realistic 
option. Far from providing a genuinely ‘restorative’ outcome, the RJ process would 
then only serve to prolong, if not intensify her entrapment within the abusive 
relationship. In such cases, the resources needed to organise a standard RJ process 
would be put to far better use if they were allocated instead to removing the 
externalities that are forcing her ‘choice’ to stay.41  
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6 .  TYPES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
6.1.  Coercive control 
As a result of some innovative statistical analysis by academics Johnson and Stark, 
much of the relevant literature has come to identify three categories of DV or Intimate 
Partner Violence (IPV): namely,  
(1) violence enacted in the service of taking general control over one’s partner 
(‘coercive control’);  
(2) violence utilized in response to coercive control (‘violent resistance’); 42  
(3) violence that is not embedded in a general pattern of power and control, but is 
a function of the escalation of a specific conflict or series of conflicts 
(‘situational couple violence’).43  
 
One problem that these categories raise for RJ is this: Whilst situational couple violence 
is statistically the most common form of IPV44, coercive control is the type that most 
people think of when they hear the term ‘domestic violence’.45  Indeed, it is cases 
involving coercive control that are most frequently referred to the police and/or DV 
support agencies.46 But DV referrals to RJ programs are most likely to come from 
criminal justice or DV support agencies. It follows that referrals to RJ are most likely 
to be cases involving coercive control. But, given the arguments above, these are 
precisely the kind of cases that standard RJ processes are not equipped to deal with 
safely and effectively.47  
6.2. Situational couple violence 
It might be argued that, whilst RJ should not be used in cases of coercive control, it 
may be appropriate for cases of situational couple violence.48 For instance, it was 
argued above that standard RJ processes are unlikely to be able to remove the deep-
seated, culturally reinforced sexism of abusers. But one ‘finding’ of the research that 
led to the categorisation above is that this level of misogyny applies more readily to 
cases of coercive control than situational couple violence: 
“[M]ale perpetrators of [coercive control] have significantly more misogynistic attitudes than do 
nonviolent men, whereas perpetrators of situational couple violence have the same attitudes 
toward women as do nonviolent men . . . . Theoretically speaking, patriarchal traditions and 
structures, average sex differences in the use of violence, and average size and strength 
differences between men and women all suggest that in heterosexual relationships [coercive 
control] will be largely male-perpetrated. Empirically speaking, the evidence, both direct and 
indirect, confirms that [coercive control] is largely male-perpetrated and related to gender 
attitudes.” 49 
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However, even if it were the case that RJ could address situational couple violence 
safely and effectively, this kind of case is unlikely to come to the attention of police or 
DV agencies. So it is unclear how cases of situational couple violence would be referred 
to a standard RJ program.  
6.3. Privatising DV 
One response to this objection might be to create voluntary referral pathways to RJ, 
thus avoiding the police or DV agencies. The eligibility criteria would be restricted to 
cases involving only situational couple violence. But there are two problems with this 
approach. First, there is a strong case for thinking that situational couple violence is 
not in fact gender symmetrical but is instead on a continuum with coercive control.  
 “We show that all domestic violence is gendered, not only the extreme forms, such as [coercive 
control]. The more serious (injurious) and frequent the domestic violence, the more gender 
asymmetrical. But even the less serious (noninjurious) and less frequent is gender 
asymmetrical. . . . [In other words] situational couple violence [and coercive control are not] 
stable types. We theorize these different patterns as steps in escalation of seriousness. Many 
households split after a limited number of acts of violence; those that do not could experience 
escalation to more frequent and serious violence.”50 
For instance, misogyny—like racism—can be so deep-seated that it issues in 
behaviour that is ‘unintentionally’ sexist. In other words, gender-based discrimination 
can be situated on a continuum from subtle insults to total subjugation. Thus, it may 
be that a conflict or a ‘fight’ (i.e. situational couple violence) was preceded by an 
ongoing pattern of misogynistic forms of subtle put-downs or micro-aggressions.51 
These behaviours are typically ambiguous, unintentional and, as such, difficult to 
identify, even for the person harmed. But the cumulative impact is acutely hurtful and 
degrading, to the point where resistance or ‘fight-back’ becomes inevitable. It seems 
clear that the underlying cause of the conflict or ‘fight’, in such cases, is not gender-
symmetrical: it is instead a consequence of the man’s view—whether overtly 
acknowledged or not—about the inferiority or inequality of women.52 It is critically 
important that RJ recognises this continuum so that it does not ‘domesticate’ the 
violence or approach it as being gender-neutral.53 But then, as noted above, it is just as 
important to acknowledge that standard RJ processes do not have the capacity, on their 
own, to address the kind of masculinity that is premised on gender inequality; and so, 
just as with coercive control, it follows that RJ is not equipped to address the underlying 
causes of situational couple violence. 
The second problem with creating informal referral pathways to RJ is this: if 
situational couple violence is on a continuum with coercive control—and so should 
still be classified and treated as DV—then it follows that there should be a public 
recognition of the seriousness of this kind of abuse. But whilst RJ is well-equipped to 
address private matters in the realm of moral repair, it is not capable of marking the 
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seriousness of a crime in a public, societal matter.54 Only the criminal justice system is 
capable of this level of public, symbolic denunciation. As Tadros puts it: 
 “The criminal justice process has unique power to mark a public recognition of the wrongful 
nature of a particular kind of conduct and to stigmatize those who perpetrate that conduct. 
Taking domestic abuse outside the criminal justice system is likely to create or reinforce the 
perception that domestic abuse is less ‘serious’ than other kinds of assault, when what has been 
argued here is that domestic abuse is often very serious, and serious in a way that distinguishes 
it from other kinds of assault.”55 
It follows that referrals to RJ that by-pass the criminal justice system will have the 
effect of both minimising the seriousness of the harm that women experience in 
contexts of situational couple violence, and reinforcing the denial of gender equality 
that underpins this kind of violence.56 
Notwithstanding these concerns about privatisation, it should be noted that there 
are significant objections to the criminal justice system’s approach to DV, especially in 
relation to its tendency to discriminate against people of colour (and especially women 
of colour)57, low-income and other minority groups; as well as its propensity to deal 
with cases of DV in a way that disempowers women, over-rides their ‘voice’, ignores 
their choices58, fails to prevent re-offending and indeed creates the conditions for 
continued DV when those responsible are released.  
Indeed, it is for these very reasons that both support-agencies and women harmed 
by DV have been keen to explore alternatives to the criminal justice system59, or at least 
parallel or supplementary approaches such as restorative justice.60 However, as many 
have pointed out, the need for an alternative does not, in itself, warrant the use of RJ 
for cases of DV. The processes used must be ‘fit for purpose’, and the arguments above 
would strongly suggest that the most widely used ‘standard’ RJ processes would require 
significant re-design before they could be safely employed in this context.61 
7 .  A WAY FORWARD 
7.1. Recommendations 
Given the number of risks and obstacles to using standard RJ processes to address DV, 
it might be thought that we should abandon this approach entirely. However, the 
consistent refrain in this paper has been that RJ processes could potentially be revised 
or adapted to suit a DV context. It would not be possible, nor desirable, to set out such 
a ‘revised version’ here, at least not in any detail. That task, as we shall see, must be 
left to the individuals and communities who are hoping to provide and use such a 
service. However, it may be helpful to put forward three recommendations.  
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7.2. Action-Research 
The use of RJ to address DV has now become relatively widespread and appears to be 
increasing. For example, a report published in 2010 identified RJ or mediation 
programs that were accepting DV cases in the US, UK, Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
Germany, Romania, Jamaica, Columbia, Australia, New Zealand, the Gambia, South 
Africa, and Thailand.62 However, a 2017 survey of evaluations found that the evidence 
for the effectiveness of this application of RJ is not substantial. Most programs have 
been able to identify cases in which the participants felt ‘satisfied’ with the outcome, 
and even reports that the violence has stopped or decreased following a RJ process.63 
However, the lack of practice-uniformity and case-types across programs and locations, 
as well as small sample sizes, mean that no general conclusions can be legitimately 
drawn.64 Moreover, it is not possible to generalise from the effectiveness of RJ in non-
DV cases, given the distinctiveness of the context and type of harm caused by DV.  
It follows from this that, whilst there is some indication that RJ processes can be 
used safely and effectively in cases of DV, any new approach cannot merely follow the 
example of previous or existing programs. Lessons can be learnt, of course; but if a 
new application of RJ principles to cases of DV is to be developed, then it must, from 
the outset, build in a rigorous action-research framework—not merely to evaluate long-
term outcomes, but also to ensure that practices and procedures are adjusted, 
improved and refined as and when the evidence demands. As Ptacek states: 
 “Given the thinness of the evaluation research on RJ and IPV, there is much to be done. Clearly, 
there are many existing practices that need rigorous follow-up research. This research should go 
beyond simple measures of recidivism and victim satisfaction to explore—using both qualitative 
and quantitative methods—the experience of the practices upon survivors, offenders, and their 
families [and practitioners], both in the short and the long term.”65 
7.3. Consultation and Collaboration 
The available research indicates that those programs which have reported some success 
were not, in fact, straightforward applications of standard RJ processes to DV cases. 
Instead, they had three distinctive features:  
a) they were co-designed and implemented in collaboration with multiple relevant 
stakeholders;  
b) they combined feminist principles with restorative practices; and  
c) they had a distinctive focus on the needs of minority groups—especially 
indigenous communities, people of colour, immigrants, people from a culturally 
and linguistically diverse background, LGBTIQ communities, and so on.  
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For instance, one of the most effective uses of a restorative approach to DV was a 
‘family group decision making’ program in North America, set up and evaluated by 
Joan Pennell and Gale Burford. The design phase involved wide-ranging consultations 
and close collaboration with women’s advocates, child and youth advocates, offender 
programs, academic researchers, the police, government officials from social services, 
corrections, victim services and prosecution.66  
Another effective program designed for cases of sexual assault67 is the RESTORE68 
Program in Arizona, which was developed by the psychologist Mary Koss in extensive 
consultation and collaboration with a wide range of stakeholders: 
“Cognizant of the importance of developing such a program with input from and accountability 
to feminist advocates and people of color, this program was developed in collaboration with 
feminist organizations, criminal justice officials, and leaders from communities of color in Pima 
County. Members of these organizations, agencies, and communities not only participated in 
focus groups but also are players in the infrastructure of RESTORE. In addition, the program 
operates under the aegis of the local sexual assault center, ensuring feminist advocates’ ongoing 
oversight and input throughout the process.” 69 
A third example is the ‘Cultural Context Model’ (CCM), which was developed by 
the Institute for Family Services in Somerset, New Jersey. This program was explicitly 
designed to address the distinctive cultural differences and needs of people harmed by 
DV from marginalised groups. The program’s design and implementation were based 
upon a systemic cultural analysis and the close involvement of relevant communities, 
both of which are key drivers of its effectiveness:  
“The CCM approaches intervention with batterers and their families from a perspective that 
acknowledges a multilayered experience of culture. More specifically, the treatment approach 
requires accountability from batterers and supports the empowerment of victims and children at 
the same time as it recognizes the impact of a number of social forces related to culture and 
cultural differences on communities, families, and individuals. These forces include such realities 
as sexism, racism, and heterosexism, as well as experiences with immigration, colonization, and 
capitalism.”70 
A second recommendation for charting a way forward, therefore, would be to begin 
any development process by engaging in a wide-ranging consultation with external and 
internal stakeholders. It must also ensure that every stage—planning, design, 
implementation and evaluation—are all informed and guided by a feminist analysis of 
the nature and causes of DV. 71   
7.4. Transformative Justice 
The main reason for not abandoning RJ entirely in cases of DV is that there are a 
number of unique benefits that a restorative approach can bring about. These are 
usefully listed by Daly and Stubbs in the following: 
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• Victim voice and participation. Victims have the opportunity to voice their story and to be 
heard. They can be empowered by confronting the offender, and by participating in 
decision making on the appropriate penalty.  
• Victim validation and offender responsibility. A victim’s account of what happened can be 
validated, acknowledging that she is not to blame. Offenders are required to take 
responsibility for their behaviour, and their offending is censured. In the process, the 
victim is vindicated.  
• Communicative and flexible environment. The process can be tailored to child and 
adolescent victims’ needs and capacities. Because it is flexible and less formal, it may be 
less threatening and more responsive to the individual needs of victims.  
• Relationship repair (if this is a goal). The process can address violence between those who 
want to continue the relationship. It can create opportunities for relationships to be 
repaired, if that is what is desired.72  
One key element missing from this list, however, is the need to take into account 
the structural inequalities and conditions of subordination that both cause and are 
caused by DV. This will primarily include gender inequality, as manifested in the 
surrounding culture and/or communities, and in the personal beliefs and attitudes of 
individuals who are involved in the process. But it should also include any other 
structural inequality or experience of subordination that might have a bearing on the 
case—either in terms of understanding proximate causes and influences but also in 
terms of identifying long-term solutions.73  
For example, Donna Coker has argued that a restorative approach to DV would be 
far more powerful if it could enable a person who inflicts DV to link his own experience 
of feeling subjugated by racial or economic inequality to the harm he is causing to his 
partner and the way in which his behaviour is driven by his beliefs about gender 
inequality. In addition, it would be considerably more effective, in the long-term, if it 
could somehow galvanise their respective families and the local community into doing 
what it can to acknowledge and address the oppression caused by both types of 
inequality.74 Similarly, Coker argues that any service that seeks to address DV in a 
restorative manner must address, so far as possible, the material and social externalities 
that constrain women’s choices—and in a way that allows for (and is supportive of) her 
decision to remain with her partner, or at least within her community.75 
Coker suggests that these additions would offer “the possibility of transforming 
communities as well as interpersonal relationships”.76 The aim would not be to 
‘restore’ things to how they were, since things were never ‘just’ to begin with.77 Instead, 
the objective would be to identify, confront and change the structures and beliefs that are 
causing (and being caused by) these inequalities and conditions of oppression.  
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In other words, whilst this approach should draw on RJ principles, both the language 
of ‘restoration’ and the way in which RJ processes are standardly practiced may be 
counter-productive and potentially misleading. For this reason, Coker distinguishes 
this approach from standard RJ processes, by calling it ‘Transformative Justice’.78 
Given the way in which this approach is likely to resolve many of the issues that have 
been raised above, it is therefore recommended that, if any program is developed so as 
to address DV in a way that can achieve the multiple benefits described above, then 
the broader concept (and even the terminology) of ‘Transformative Justice’ be used.  
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